Tool approval has two independent inputs:
- Tool declaration β every tool may declare an
approvaltier:read: reads data or updates UI-only session metadata.write: mutates workspace/session state but does not execute arbitrary code.exec: executes code, shells out, drives a browser, spawns agents, or performs similarly broad actions.
- User policy β
tools.approval.<toolName>: allow | deny | promptoverrides the mode for that tool unless a non-yolo safety override forces a prompt.
Tools without an approval declaration are treated as exec. This is the safe default for unknown custom tools. MCP server tools declare write.
Modes
Configure with tools.approvalMode:
| Mode | Auto-approves | Prompts for |
|---|---|---|
always-ask | read | write, exec |
write | read, write | exec |
yolo (default) | read, write, exec | none |
--auto-approve and --yolo force tools.approvalMode: yolo for the session.
User overrides
tools.approval is honored in every mode:
tools:
approvalMode: write
approval:
bash: prompt
read: allow
mcp__filesystem__delete: denyResolution per tool call:
- Compute the toolβs approval decision from
tool.approval(args); omitted meansexec. - Normalize
tools.approval.<tool>if present; invalid values are ignored. - In
yolomode, the user policy is used when present; otherwise the call is allowed. Safetyoverridereasons do not force a prompt inyolo. - In non-yolo modes, if the tool sets
override: true,denyis blocked and all other cases prompt, even if user policy saysallow. - Otherwise, a valid user policy wins.
- Otherwise, the active mode auto-approves or prompts by tier.
Safety overrides
A tool can force a prompt with object-form approval:
approval: { tier: "exec", override: true, reason: "Critical pattern detected" }bash uses this for critical destructive patterns such as rm -rf /, fork bombs, remote-fetch-then-execute, writes to /etc/passwd, and host shutdown commands. These surface as reason in the approval prompt, but in yolo mode they are auto-approved unless a user policy for the tool is set to prompt or deny.
Per-tool prompt details
Tools can add approval-prompt body lines with formatApprovalDetails(args). The standard prompt includes:
Allow tool: <name>Origin: MCP server toolfor unannotatedmcp__...toolsReason: <reason>when the tool decision supplies one- tool-specific details such as command, path, code, browser action, or subagent assignment
Defining approval on tools
Built-in and custom tools share the same shape:
export type ToolTier = "read" | "write" | "exec";
export type ToolApprovalDecision = ToolTier | { tier: ToolTier; reason?: string; override?: boolean };
export type ToolApproval = ToolApprovalDecision | ((args: unknown) => ToolApprovalDecision);
approval?: ToolApproval;
formatApprovalDetails?: (args: unknown) => string | string[] | undefined;Examples:
approval: "read"
approval: (args) => (LSP_READONLY_ACTIONS.has(args.action) ? "read" : "write")
approval: (args) =>
isCritical(args.command)
? { tier: "exec", override: true, reason: "Critical pattern detected" }
: "exec"ACP sessions
ACP (omp acp) uses the same settings resolver as normal OMP launches. Global ~/.omp/agent/config.yml applies, project config for the ACP session cwd applies, and any --config <file> overlays passed to the ACP server process apply to sessions created by that process.
To auto-approve ACP tool calls, set the mode in global or project config:
tools:
approvalMode: yoloOr launch the ACP server with a runtime override or a one-process config overlay:
omp acp --yolo
omp acp --auto-approve
omp acp --approval-mode yolo
omp acp --config ./acp-yolo.yml # file contains tools.approvalMode: yoloPrecedence is the normal settings precedence: runtime flags (--approval-mode, --auto-approve, --yolo) override --config overlays, which override project config, which overrides global config. ACP does not currently define a session/new, session/load, or session/resume approval-policy field, so ACP clients that need per-session yolo should launch a separate omp acp process with one of the flags above or with a session-specific --config overlay.
tools.approvalMode: yolo fully applies to ACP when it is explicitly configured or supplied by a runtime flag. It skips OMPβs approval prompts and also skips the ACP client permission gate for bash, edit, delete, and move unless tools.approval.<tool> is prompt or deny. The schema default is yolo, but default-config ACP sessions still keep the client permission gate; set tools.approvalMode: yolo explicitly when the client wants unattended execution.
When ACP approval is required, OMP routes it through the ACP client instead of the terminal TUI. Client-gated bash, edit, delete, and move calls use ACP session/request_permission; generic approval prompts use form elicitation when the client advertises elicitation.form. A rejected, cancelled, or unsupported prompt rejects/cancels the tool call; OMP does not silently allow it.
Subagents
Subagents run headless with tools.approvalMode: yolo so they do not stall waiting for UI. The parent task approval is the authorization boundary. User tools.approval.<tool> settings continue to control whether a tool is allowed, prompted, or blocked.